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1 INTRODUCTION
Body Mass Index (BMI) is a widely used health quantity calculated as kд/m2. The world health organization categorizes
BMI broadly into Underweight [0, 18.5), Normal [18.5, 25), Overweight [25, 30), and Obese [30,+∞) [11]. Kocabey et
al. recently developed a regression task Face-to-BMI [6], where they accurately predicted BMI from images of human
faces. The motivation for their study was identifying how an individual’s BMI affects their treatment by others on
social media platforms [7].
In this paper we instead focus on the application of Face-to-BMI in the insurance industry, where adversarial attacks
could become a issue. Suppose an insurance company uses a neural network to predict the BMI of their clients from
photos and then uses this information to influence coverage. There are two scenarios in which an adversarial attacker
may want to manipulate the input photo inperceptibly to attack the BMI predictor: (1) the attacker may want to make
someone appear healthier to lower their rates; (2) conversely, make someone appear unhealthy to sabotage that person’s
insurance application. We demonstrate that a neural network performing Face-to-BMI is indeed vulnerable to test-time
adversarial attacks. This extends test-time adversarial attacks from classification tasks (e.g. [2, 4, 9, 10]) to regression.
2 ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS ON FACE-TO-BMI PREDICTION
The victim neural network f : R227×227×3 → R takes as input a 227× 227× 3 face image and outputs a BMI estimate.
We use Alexnet [8] layers conv1 to fc7 plus one linear layer after fc7 to perform regression.
The threat model assumes a whitebox attacker with full knowledge of the victim weights and architecture. The
attacker can edit any pixels in the photo, including those not on the human. We consider targeted attacks to force f
prediction into a pre-specified target range [L,U ] ⊂ R.
The attack formulation find the minimum perturbation δ such that for input input X , f (X + δ ) ∈ [L,U ]. Both X
and X + δ must be valid images with integer pixel values in 0–255. We measure perturbation by its ℓp norm ∥δ ∥p for
some p ∈ (0,∞] [2, 4, 9, 10]. Thus, the ideal attack solves
min
δ ∈R227×227×3
∥δ ∥p subject to L ≤ f (X + δ ) ≤ U , and (X + δ ) ∈ I := {0, . . . , 255}227×227×3 . (1)
However, this is a difficult integer program. We heuristically solve a related problem to simply find a small enough δ .
We reformulate the attack goal as follows: L ≤ f (X + δ ) ≤ U ⇔
(
f (X + δ ) − U+L2
)2 ≤ (U−L2 )2 . We relax the integral
constraint on δ and change the objective:
min
δ ∈R227×227×3
(
f (X + δ ) − U + L2
)2
subject to (X + δ ) ∈ [0, 255]227×227×3 . (2)
We initialize δ = 0 and perform early-stopping as soon as f (X + Round(δ )) ∈ [L,U ] to encourage small norm on δ .
3 EXPERIMENTS
Datasets. We use two datasets of (photo, BMI) pairs: (1) Federal Corrections Body Mass Index (FCBMI) consists of 9045
public photos at multiple federal and state corrections facilities. (2) VisualBMI dataset with 4206 photos collected by [6]
from Reddit.
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Training the victim network. We train the BMI prediction network with transfer-learning. We load weights
pre-trained on the ILSVRC 2012 data set for the conv1 to fc7 layers of Alexnet. Then we randomly initialize the last
linear layer using Xavier [3]. Finally we fine tune the entire network’s weights using our own training images. We use a
random subset of 7000 images in FCBMI for fine-tuning, and keep the remaining 2045 images in FCBMI and the whole
VisualBMI for testing. We pre-process the images identically to in AlexNet [8]: images are converted from RGB to BGR,
re-sized to 227 × 227 × 3. Finally we subtract the grand mean pixel value from each pixel in the images in the training
set. This means that we provide an input in [−255, 255]227×227×3 to the neural network at test time. During training we
use ℓ2 loss. We use the Adam [5] optimizer with β1 = 0.9, β2 = 0.999. The batch size is 64 and learning rate is 0.0001.
Attack implementation. To solve (2) the attacker simulates the victim by pre-pending an extra input layer with X
and 1s:
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The attacker freezes the weights of the entire network except δ and trains the network using projected gradient
descent on the objective in (2). Once training is complete, the attacker takes a final projection step and rounds δ so that
(X + δ ) ∈ I .
Algorithm 1 Adversarially attacking the BMI prediction network
Input: f : BMI prediction network,
X : victim image,
K > 0: Max iterations
Output: δ : perturbation such that f (X + δ ) ∈ [L, U ] and (X + δ ) ∈ I
δ ← 0
k ← 0
while k < K or f (X + Round(δ )) < [L, U ] do
δ ← δ − ηk ∇δ
(
f (X + δ ) − U +L2
)2
{gradient descent with step size ηk }
Project δ such that (X + δ ) ∈ [0, 255]227×227×3
k ← k + 1
end while
δ ← Round(δ ) {rounds δ such that X + δ is moved to the nearest point in I }
return δ {flags a failure if final δ is unsuccessful after K iterations}
Qualitative results. Figure 1 shows the BMI attack on 8 photos from the VisualBMI data set. We obscured the eyes
with black boxes to preserve partial anonymity of those pictured. The boxes are not present in the original data set, so
neither the prediction network nor the attacker saw or were influenced by them. Here the attack goal is to force BMI
predictions into the normal range [L,U ] = [18.7, 24.9]. The attacker succeeds at this. We note that all changes have
small infinite norm: ∥δ ∥∞ ≤ 2. Also, δs have more nonzero elements and vary more the further the original BMI is
from the target range.
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Quantitative results. We demonstrate two attacks separately: “make-healthy” where the attacker forces BMI
predictions into [L,U ] = [18.7, 24.9] corresponding to normal weight, and “make-obese” with attack target range of
[L,U ] = [30, 40] corresponding to obesity. We use the 2045 test images from the FCBMI data set and all 4206 images in
the VisualBMI data set. Figure 2(left) shows BMI before and after attack on VisualBMI. One may expect the attack to
just project the predicted BMI onto the boundary of the target range. We see almost exactly that, but there is some
minor variance within the target region due to rounding of δ . Infrequently, there are large outliers where the rounding
shifts the prediction to the other side of the target range. One example of this phenomenon is the right-most face in
Figure 1. Figure 2(right) shows ∥δ ∥2 under both attacks. As expected, the further a victim’s initially predicted BMI from
the target region, the larger the norm of the perturbation δ . Figure 3 shows ∥δ ∥∞ on the FCBMI test set. The same
trend holds. Also note the maximum pixel value change is small, roughly 5 out of 255. These attacks will be difficult for
humans to perceive.
4 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
We have demonstrated that naïve whitebox adversarial attacks can be a threat to Face-to-BMI regression. For this
reason, we urge caution when using BMI predicted from images in applications such as insurance, as they can be
manipulated to make someone’s rates artificially lower or higher.
The attacks in this paper requires the ability to modify any pixels. A more realistic attack would be physical, e.g.
have the person wear make-up or accessories like glasses. An intermediate simulated attack could restrict the attack
within face or skin pixels. Combining these with e.g. Expectation-Over-Transformation as in [1] might allow someone
to design adversarial make-up they could wear to influence the predicted BMI.
(a) f (X ) : 17.38 19.39 21.46 23.49 25.48 27.89 29.41 31.51
(b) (∥δ ∥∞ = 1, ∥δ ∥2 = 100) (0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0) (1, 72.42) (1, 158.4) (1, 206.9) (1, 312.0)
(c) f (X + δ ) : 19.72 19.39 21.46 23.49 24.01 23.64 23.18 18.76
Fig. 1. Attacks forcing BMI predictions into the “normal weight” range [18.7, 24.9]. Row (a): Original BMI prediction f (X ). Row (b): Attack δ and its norms. δ ’s color scale
maps [-2, 2] linearly to [0, 255] (gray = no attack). Row (c): Attacked BMI prediction f (X + δ ).
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Fig. 2. Left: x -axis: the initial BMI prediction f (X ),y-axis: the corresponding attacked BMI prediction f (X+δ ) for each image in the VisualBMI data set.We have highlighted
the relevant target ranges. Right: x -axis: f (X ), y-axis: the corresponding ∥δ ∥2 of the first successful rounded δ for each victim image in the VisualBMI data set.
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Fig. 3. Attack ∥δ ∥∞ on the FCBMI test set for make-healthy (Left) and make-obese (Right) attacks. To help visualize the distribution
of data we dithered the norms using iid Gaussian noise with mean 0 and variance .005
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